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The role of the ethnic factor in political 
processes in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia has 
been rather significant since these countries 
gained independence. The author investigates 
the following assumption: after the completion 
of major Eurointegration pro¬cedures, the 
ethnic factor — which became especially im-
portant in the Baltics after independence — 
relegated to the periphery of political life. 
After a period of ‘independence-in-
duced euphoria’ faded, Lithuanian, Latvian 
and Estonian power groups had to tackle 
the problem of civil society formation and 
the development of a political regime based 
on democratic procedures. In these coun-
tries the processes of elite recruitment were 
largely affected by the factor of ethic ho-
mogeneity of the social structure. This arti-
cle analyses the process of elite group for-
mation in the Baltics through the lens of the 
ethnic factor. By applying the ethnopoliti-
cal approach, the author concludes that the 
de facto barriers to non-titular population 
groups entering power structures, which 
exist in Latvia and Estonia, ‘freeze’ the sys-
tem of elite recruitment. In the conditions 
of increasing social unrest, it may have an 
adverse effect on the overall political sta-
bility in these countries. 
The results obtained can be used for 
research, educational, and practical pur-
poses. In the field of research and educa-
tion, they can be employed in further re-
search on the transformation of the elite 
structure in the Baltics in view of the eth-
nopolitical factor, including comparative 
analysis of the elite re-grouping processes, 
as well as in developing corresponding 
university courses. As to the practical as-
pect, the results obtained can be used by 
the authorities of the Russian Federation in 
making decisions regarding interaction 
with the representatives of Lithuanian, Lat-
vian and Estonian political elites. 
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by political scientists over the last quarter century. As to the Lithuanian, 
Latvian, and Estonian republics, the role of ethnical factor in politics has 
been relevant since independence. But can one claim that, after the comple-
tion of the main Euro integration procedures, the ethnic factor, to which ma-
jor significance was attached earlier, was pushed towards the periphery of 
the political life? Different aspects of the involvement of ethnic groups into 
political processes have been actively discussed by political scientists over 
the last quarter century. As to the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian repub-
lics, the role of ethnical factor in politics has been relevant since independ-
ence. But can one claim that, after the completion of the main Euro integra-
tion procedures, the ethnic factor, to which major significance was attached 
earlier, was pushed towards the periphery of the political life? 
With the help of the ethnopolitical approach1, let us analyse the actual 
political interactions in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia paying special atten-
tion to the features of political elite recruitment2. According to V. Tishkov, 
the disintegration of the USSR resembled a revolt of a province against the 
central power more than a politically and legally correct procedure of inde-
pendence declaration. The political legitimacy was attached to this process 
by the ‘popular’ (more precisely, ehtnonationalistic) movements, in particu-
lar, the popular fronts of the Baltics. It is they that developed the “ideology 
of disintegration”, whose elements were borrowed by nationalist movements 
other Union republics and autonomous areas in Russia. The replacement of 
the notion ‘nation’ with that of ‘ethnos’ played an important role in the ideo-
logical justification of the imminent disintegration [7, с. 154]. 
After the euphoria caused by independence had faded, the power groups of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia faced the problems of developing a civil society 
and creating a political regime based on democratic procedures. In these coun-
tries, the processes of elite recruitment have been affected by the ethnic homo-
geneity of society. Data on the population composition of all three countries 
over the last 25 years is presented in Table 1. 
In Lithuania, the Lithuanian ethnic group constitutes the overwhelming 
majority; two other large groups are the Polish and Russians3. The population 
composition of the Lithuanian Republic did not undergo any significant 
changes over the Soviet period. According to the 1959 census, Lithuanians ac-
counted for 79.3 % of the country’s residents; in 1989, their share was 79.6 %. 
At the same time, the percentage of the title population was decreasing in the 
other two republics: 74.6 % in 1959 and 61.5 % in 1989 in Estonia; 62 % and 
52 % in Latvia [2]. Against the background of stable specific weight of the title 
nation, the number of Lithuanians at power was constantly increasing. Antanas 
                                                     
1 For more detail on the heuristic value of the ethnopolitical approach when consider-
ing events in the field of enthnnational relation and analysing the causes, forms and 
methods of intended politicisation of ethnicity see the works of  V. Tishkov [5—7].  
2 In this case, elites are viewed from the functional rather than value perspective, i.e. 
as individual exerting decisive influence on making decisions crucial for the society.  
3 Researcher emphasise that the largest ethnic minorities (the Polish and Russians) 
generally tend to support the idea of integrating into the Lithuanian society, although 
they demonstrate different adaptation strategies. — For more detail, see [11]. 
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Sniečkus, the head of the Communist Party of Lithuania in 1936—1974, 
played a significant role in this process. He was on good terms with the Soviet 
leadership, and as a result managed to minimise the deployment of large in-
dustrial facilities in Lithuania, which would entail an inflow of a considerable 
number of non-Lithuanian Soviet citizens in the country. In 1953—1990, the 
number of incoming migrants amounted to 1.09 m people [16]. 
 
Table 1 
 
Population of the Baltics, 1989—20114, million people, % 
 
Country 1989 2000 2011 
Lithuania: 
Total population 
Including: 
Lithuanians 
Russians 
 
3.674/100 
 
2.924 / 79.6 
0.344 / 9.40 
 
3.484/100 
 
2.907 / 83.5 
0.219 / 6.3 
 
3.244/100 
 
2.721 / 83.9 
0.174 / 5.4 
Latvia: 
Total population 
Including: 
Latvians 
Russians 
 
2.666 
 
1.387 / 52.0 
0.905 / 34.0 
 
2.377 
 
1.370 / 57.7 
0.703 / 29.6 
 
2.070 
 
1.284 / 62.1 
0.556 / 26.9 
Estonia: 
Total population 
Including: 
Estonians 
Russians 
 
1.565 
 
0.963 / 61.5 
0.474 / 30.3 
 
1.370 
 
0.930 / 67.9 
0.351 / 25.6 
 
1.340 
 
0.924 / 69.0 
0.341 / 25.5 
 
Lithuania has several areas densely populated by different ethnic groups. 
East Lithuania is multi-ethnic; half of the population is Lithuanian, one third 
Polish, one fifth Belarusian, and one tenth Russian. In Šalčininkai, the Polish 
account for the absolute majority — 79.5 %, Lithuanians for 10.4 %, 
Russians for 5 %. In the Vilnius region, 61.3 % of residents are Polish, 
22.4 % Lithuanian, 8.4 % Russian. Russians reside predominantly in Zarasai, 
Trakai, and Visaginas. 
Various research and election campaign results show that the ethnic mi-
norities are not very active in the political life of modern Lithuania5. Their 
presence in high-level political structures and governmental institutions is 
insignificant. If representatives of ethnic minorities manage to secure a pub-
                                                     
4 According to national censuses (there is no data on the number of Ukrainians, Bel-
arusians, Jews, Gypsies, and other groups). 
5 The election law adopted in 1992 introduced a lower threshold for ensuring par-
liamentary representation of Russian and Polish minorities within political parties 
participating in election according to the proportional system: the universal thresh-
old was 4%, the one for ethnic parties - 2%. In 1996, amendments were made to the 
law, according to which the universal threshold was raised to 5%, the one for elec-
toral alliances to 7%, the one for ethnic minorities was abolished.  
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lic position, in most cases it is one in the Seimas; as a rule, they are sup-
ported by ‘regular’ parties6, i. e. those that do not declare the protection of 
rights of ethnic minorities a priority. The analysis of the post-independence 
composition of all Cabinets shows that ethnic minorities held ministerial po-
sitions only in a handful of cases7. Predominantly, they worked at the mu-
nicipal level. The Polish community has, as a rule, strong presence in the re-
gions of Vilnius and Šalčininkai, and the Russian — in Klaipeda and 
Visaginas. The ethnic minority parties do not have many members (500—
1000 people), their influence on authorities is insignificant (both due to the 
modest numbers and the positions they occupy), which does not make it 
possible to think of the parties as an adequate channel for political elite 
recruitment [10]. 
In the period of establishing independence, the Republic of Lithuania 
had a well-defined political structure, whose ‘core’ was comprised by the 
members of the Communist Party — the nomenklatura recruited 
predominantly from the title nation. If, in 1945, Lithuanians accounted for 
30 % of the Communist party members, in 1952, their percentage increased 
to 38 %, in the mid-1980s, to 70 %; Lithuanians also held 91.5 % of 
administrative positions [13]. 
In Latvia and Estonia the specific weight of the title nation in the elite 
structure was rather insignificant. By the mid-1980s, Latvians accounted for 
less than 40 % of the Communist party members, whereas, in Estonia, the 
title nation accounted for just above 50 %. 
As to the bureaucracy, Latvians held 61.3 % of such positions, Estonians 
82.2 % [17]. Throughout the Soviet period, the numbers of ethnic Lithuani-
ans in the political elite of Lithuania remained high, whereas other groups 
constituted the minority8. 
Lithuania approached the moment of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
with elite that was ethnically homogenous: the actual administrative levers 
were the realm of the national Lithuanian elite, which made decisions in line 
                                                     
6 The Lithuanian Russian Union formed a coalition with the Social Democrat Party 
of Lithuania in the 2000 election. As a result of the parliamentary campaign, the 
leaders of the Lithuanian Russian Union – brother and sister S. Dmitriev and 
L. Dmitrieva –stood in the election with the Labour Party. Before that, the Dmitrievs 
worked together in the Vilnius City Council. A representative of the Russian Alli-
ance, I. Rozova, became a member of the Seimas running in the election with the 
Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – a party focusing on the protection of the 
Polish minority, which joined the incumbent governmental coalition.  
7 At the same time, one cannot ignore the case of the famous Lithuanian political of 
Russian origin, the leader of the Labour Party, a former member of the European 
Parliament, V. Uspaskich, who served as the Minister of Economy in 2004—2005. 
8 However, it would be incorrect to associate the high percentage of the title nation 
representatives within the political elite with Lithuanian support for the Soviet re-
gime. The façade of an ideological monolith (which also holds true for Latvia and 
Estonia) concealed the real attitude, which, according to A. Štromas, boiled down to 
the total denial of the victory of communism over the Baltic peoples. — For futher 
detail, see [16].  
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with the Communist Party’s policy, but enjoyed significant autonomy. By 
the end of the Soviet period, although legally accountable to Moscow, the 
country was administered by the Lithuanian elite, which was even more ho-
mogenous than during the interbellum [8]. 
In Estonia and Latvia, ethnicity became the basis for political segregation 
after independence. The creation of an exclusive ‘environment’ for the title na-
tion significantly complicated and almost eliminated all vertical mobility op-
portunities for representatives of other ethnic groups9. Latvian scholar 
J. Rozenvalds analysed the generalised group of “East Slavs” (see Table 2) [3]. 
 
Table 2 
 
Correlation between population groups in Latvia and Estonia  
in the 19th—21st centuries,% 
 
Country 
18
97
 
19
22
—
19
25
 
19
34
—
19
35
 
19
59
 
19
79
 
19
89
 
20
00
 
20
09
—
20
11
 
Latvia: 
   Latvians 68 73.4 75.5 62 53.7 52 57.7 59.5 
   East Slavs  12 12.6 12.1 30.9 40 42 36.4 33.3 
Estonia: 
   Estonians 91 87.6 88.1 74.6 64.7 61.5 67.9 68.7 
   East Slavs  4 8.2 8.2 22.3 32 35.2 29 28.9 
 
Demographic changes, which had a significant effect on the title groups 
of Estonia and Latvia, resulted in the dramatic transformation of general atti-
tudes: many Latvians and Estonians started to associate and even identify 
‘the Russian’ with ‘the Soviet’, thus holding post-war migrants accountable 
for the Soviet period. To a degree, this was a backlash from the times when 
the share of East Slavs in the Communist Parties of the Baltics significantly 
exceeded that in the general population of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 
(representatives of the title national accounted for 69, 39, and 52 % of the 
Communist party members respectively). 
It is worth stressing that there are some notable differences between Es-
tonia and Latvia as to the features of development of the Russian-speaking 
                                                     
9 Lithuania chose the ‘citizenship by default’ pattern, when it was granted to anyone 
who resided in Lithuania when independence was declared, and expressed the desire 
to acquire it. As a result, most members of the Russian community hold Lithuanian 
citizenship. It was a result not only of the good will of the Lithuanian political elites, 
but also the disproportionally strong (in comparison to the percentage of Russians in 
Lithuania) presence of Russians in Sąjūdis during the years of transition. It is that 
period that saw the development of the conceptual framework of citizenship law, 
during which members of the Russian community managed to protect their interests. 
— For further detail, see [14]. 
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communities, since it still has a significant effect on the nature and prospects 
of their involvement in the political process. The Latvian community is his-
torically more numerous and better organised, which was proved by the 
2012 referendum on the making Russian an official language and the 2013 
election to the so-called ‘Parliament of the non-represented’. Speaking of the 
settlement tradition, it is important to mention that Russians prevail, as a 
rule, in the North-Western part of Estonia (for example, in Narva, Estonians 
account for no more than 4 % of the population) and Tallinn (44 %). Since 
the rest of Estonian territory is populated by the title nation, such segmenta-
tion is an objective obstacle to the possible integration of two ethnic com-
munities, as well as the consolidation of Russians for participating in the po-
litical process. In Latvia, the Russian-speaking population is spread more 
evenly. There are approximately 800,000 Russian-speaking residents (35 %, 
the total population of Latvia is 2.2 m people). The key areas of their resi-
dence are Riga (43 %), Daugavpils (55 %), Rēzekne (49 %), Jūrmala (36 %), 
Liepāja (34 %), Ventspils (32 %), and Jelgava (30 %). 
During the so-called Singing Revolution, two models of declaring inde-
pendence were discussed in Estonia and Latvia. The first, promoted by the 
popular fronts, was dubbed ‘social-realistic’, since it aimed to take into account 
the post-war situation and gain the support of general public (regardless of na-
tionality). The second — ‘legalist’, advocated by the so called civil committees, 
presumed the illegal nature of the Soviet rule, and thus all post-war immigrants 
were, too, proclaimed illegal, which excluded them from active political life. For 
example, in February-March 1991 (alongside the Referendum on the Future of 
the Soviet Union initiated by M. Gorbachev), when the authorities of the Baltics 
started to study the opinion of the local population about independence 
(in Lithuania and Estonia, it was considered an electoral consultation, in Estonia, 
a referendum), in Estonia, the right to vote was granted to the citizens of the pre-
war republic, their direct descendants, as well as individuals who made an oral 
statement of support for independence and were given the so-called ‘green 
cards’ from the civil committees (approximately 25,000 people) [15]. 
The first generation of the Latvian Popular Front leaders paid a lot of at-
tention to working with the Russian-speaking population, resulting in a 
wide-spread support of the idea of independence among Latvian Russians. In 
1991, independence was supported by 94 % of Latvians and 38 % of Rus-
sians. Because two thirds of the Russian population had either positive of 
neutral attitudes towards the initiatives of the Popular Front of Latvia, it was 
possible for Latvia to peacefully gain independence. However, many prom-
ises made in the years of the ‘Singing Revolution’ were not kept after the 
event; the leadership of both Latvia and Estonia restored the rights of the 
citizens of the pre-war republics, whereas post-war immigrants and their de-
scendants were deprived of their political freedoms. The Latvian and Esto-
nian elites ignored the social-realistic model opting instead for the ‘legalist’ 
pattern. A large part of the Russian-speaking communities of Estonia and 
Latvia had limited opportunities for participating in the processes taking 
place in the republics and influencing the political situation (certain political 
leaders were marginalised) [3]. 
V. Smirnov 
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According to Latvian scholars B. Zepa and I. Šūpule, through hindering 
social integration, members of the political elite increase tensions in the so-
ciety: “They still use ethnicity to appeal to voters. Thus, it is politicians who 
serve as the major catalyser of ethnic tensions” [1, c. 9]. This perspective 
was formulated as a result of a study into the ethnopolitical tensions in Lat-
via focusing on the ways to resolve the conflict, which was carried out as 
early as 2005. However, as the municipal election held in Latvian in June 
2013 showed, it is still relevant. 
The problem of the Russian community participation in the political lives 
of Latvia and Estonia is a product of not only the ethnic factor; the citizenship 
issue also aggravates it. The so-called ‘aliens’ emerged as a result of inde-
pendence declared in 1991. In Latvia, the legal framework that brought about 
this population category was provided by the law on the restoration of the 
rights of the citizens of the Latvian Republic and the basic conditions for natu-
ralisation adopted by the Supreme Council of the Latvian Republic on October 
12, 1991. Citizenship was granted only to the citizens of pre-war Latvia and 
their descendants. Individuals who did not meet this requirement were not 
given Latvian citizenship. Legally, the status of ‘aliens’ was introduced by the 
law on the status of citizens of the former USSR not holding Latvian or any 
other citizenship adopted on April 12, 1995. The category of ‘aliens’ included 
former USSR citizens, who did not hold any citizenship at the time the law 
was adopted and met the following legal requirement: “On July 1, 1992, they 
were, regardless of the status of the housing specified in the registration, regis-
tered on the territory of Latvia or their last registered residence before July 1, 
1992 was on the territory of the Latvian Republic or a court decision estab-
lished the fact that, prior to the mentioned date, they had resided on the terri-
tory of Latvia for at least 10 years”. This definition also extended to the chil-
dren of such persons who did not hold any citizenship. 
As a result of following the ‘legalist’ approach, the number of former 
citizens of the USSR, who were not granted citizenship by default, amounted 
to 715,000 people in Latvia (the naturalisation process began in 1995) and 
500,000 people in Estonia (the naturalisation process was launched in 1992). 
They were issued passports emphasising their legal status: purple in Latvia 
and grey in Estonia. Most naturalisation applications were submitted in 
1993—1997. Since 1995, when the naturalisation procedure was introduced, 
138,000 people have obtained Latvian citizenship in its framework. Accord-
ing to the Latvian Office for Citizenship and Migration Affairs, more than 
312,000 aliens were registered in the country in 2012. Most of them are Rus-
sian (more than 205,000 people), approximately 42,000 are Belarusians, 
30,000 Ukrainians, 8,000 Lithuanians, and less than 500 Estonians. A short 
increase in citizenship granting, which took place in 2005—2006 (19,100 ap-
plicants were granted citizenship in 2005, 15,100 in 2006) was followed by a 
steep decrease: 6800 people became Latvian citizens in 2007, approximately 
3,000 in 2008, and 2,000 in 2009. In the recent years, the naturalisation rate 
decreased: 1160 people became citizens in Estonia and 2330 in Latvia. The 
successful completion of all naturalisation tests does not guarantee the ob-
taining of the status of a Latvian citizen: so, in 2004, the country’s govern-
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ment refused citizenship to an activist of the oppositional party ‘For Human 
Rights in United Latvia’, Yu. Petropavlovsky, although he had passed the 
naturalisation procedure according to the Latvian laws. 
Latvian ‘aliens’ are excluded from the political life of the country: they 
cannot vote either in parliamentary or local elections (unlike, for instance, Es-
tonia, where the institution of ‘aliens’ also exists but they have the right to 
vote in municipal elections). However, in 2004, the Latvian Saeima approved 
amendments to the Constitution, which give EU citizens permanently residing 
in Latvia the right to participate in municipal elections. ‘Aliens’ are deprived 
of a number of social and economic rights — there are up to 80 differences in 
the rights of citizens and aliens (there were 61 differences in 2004 and 70 in 
2006), including 47 professional restrictions (25 in 2004)10. In particular, 
‘aliens’ cannot serve as public or municipal officers, hold military positions, 
works as judges and prosecutors; they do not have the right to establish politi-
cal parties. As well as citizens, ‘aliens’ have to pay all taxes but, at the same 
time, are deprived of political representation. Thus, ‘Latvian Latvia’ is ignor-
ing the classical principle “No taxation without representation”. One can de-
fine the regime that has developed in Latvia as ‘ethnocracy’ — the politically 
dominant ethnic group ‘privatises’ the state [7, с. 144—145]. 
Discrimination and large-scale violation of human rights in Latvia has 
been mentioned in the reports of the related structures and experts of the UN, 
OSCE, the Council of Europe, PACE, the European Commission, and Am-
nesty International. They referred, in particular, to the violation of the 
1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the 
1996 Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National 
Minorities, the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, etc. In May 2005, 
the Latvian Saeima ratified the European Council’s Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities with two reservations abolishing 
the Convention provisions ensuring the right of national minorities to com-
municate with the authorities within the areas of their dense residence in 
their own language and to use their native tongue for topographic purposes. 
An additional declaration almost excluded permanent Russian-speaking resi-
dents of Latvia having the status of ‘non-residents’ from the scope of the 
Convention. 
In Latvia, the need to ‘let Russians into politics’ has been actively dis-
cussed within the political and expert community for many years, however, 
in practice, political mobility is hampered by ethnic restrictions. The Rus-
sian-speaking community has made numerous attempts to overcome the 
seemingly unbreakable barrier of ethnic isolation. In most cases, these at-
tempts were connected with the initiatives of the political alliances — For 
Human Rights in United Latvia (FHRUL) and the Harmony Centre. 
FHRUL, which considers the recognition of aliens as Latvian citizens with 
a single legislative document to be the only “morally justified” way of restor-
ing the political rights of non-citizens, supports all intermediate steps in this 
                                                     
10 For more detail see the website of the Latvian Non-Citizens Congress (www.kongress.lv). 
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direction: the ‘default pattern’ for certain categories of aliens, the permission 
to participate in municipal election, the elimination of barriers to participation 
in public administration as well as professional restrictions. The party is not 
represented either in the Riga Council or the Saeima; however, one representa-
tive of FHRUL is a member of the European Parliament, his term ends in 
2014. The 2013 municipal campaign was a complete failure for the party. 
The Harmony Centre advocates the acceleration and simplification of 
naturalisation, facilitation of the integration of ‘non-citizens’ through grant-
ing them more rights, including that to elect municipal representatives, free 
choice of the language of education at school, and the adaptation of the pub-
lic administration system to the needs of the multicultural community of 
Latvia. Since 2009, the Harmony Centre has had a majority of seats in the 
Riga City Council, the mayor of the city is a Latvian citizen of Russian ori-
gin, Nils Ušakovs. As a result of the 2011 election, the Harmony Centre has 
the largest representation in the Saeima, however, it could not participate in 
the government formation, since the ‘Latvian’ parties — the Unity, the Re-
form Party, and the nationalist All For Latvia! — created a coalition. Despite 
the best result in the parliamentary campaign, the efforts of the coalition 
robbed the Harmony Centre of any opportunity to make key political deci-
sions. In February 2012, the Harmony Centre leaders supported referendum 
on making Russian an official language of Latvia, which led to a national 
political crisis. A new non-governmental organisation — the Non-citizen 
Congress — that formed the “Parliament of the Non-represented” started its 
work in March 2013; it counts on support for the country’s rational political 
powers. The ethnic factor is still playing an important role in the political 
process in Latvia; it has not been withdrawn from the agenda. 
A similar situation is observed in Estonia, where 68 % of the population 
are Estonian, and ethnic minorities account for 32 %. After the independ-
ence, the ruling groups rejected the principle of equal democratic participa-
tion of national minorities — the democratic ideal of minority representation 
was viewed as a direct threat to national independence [2]. Only decades 
later, according to Estonian researchers L. Kalev and R. Ruutsoo, an attempt 
at shifting the paradigm from the ethnically centralised to the liberal (civil) 
model was made [9]. The actions of the Estonian authorities towards the 
Russian-speaking minority are dictated by the integration policy. Thus, in 
the post-Soviet period, no Russian-speaking party managed to win seats in 
the Estonian parliament on its own. The best result — six seats in 1995 and 
1999 — was shown by the Russian Party of Estonia (RPE), when it was a 
member of the Our Home is Estonia alliance (RPE ceased to exist in 2012 
becoming part of the Social Democratic Part of Estonia). As a rule, Estonian 
Russian-speaking voters support the Centre Party headed by the mayor of 
Tallinn, E. Savisaar [18]. As well as in Latvia, Estonian centrists — despite 
being supported by the electorate — find themselves in isolation; they were 
not included into the ruling coalition either in 2007 or 2011. The representa-
tion of the political interests of Russians is treated with suspicion by the title 
nation, which has been prevalent in the elite segment of the society for a 
quarter of the century [12]. 
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Thus, the ethnic factor has a significant effect on both the political proc-
ess and the formation of elite groups in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Dec-
ades after the independence, the ethnic problems are still relevant, which 
makes it possible to speak of social lifts being ‘sealed’ in the conditions of 
ehtnocratic regimes and the system of elite recruitment being ‘frozen’, which 
cannot but affect the quality of public administration and relations between 
the Baltics and Russia. Inefficient ethnic policy initiatives (like putting off 
the ‘alien’ problem solution), the ‘sealing’ of the elite recruitment processes 
as a result of a narrow understanding of nation (the violation of the voting 
rights of ‘strangers’, their isolation from political administration) grant the 
ruling groups exclusive access to power ensuring the ‘stability’ of national 
political life. In the long run, however, such situation can be fraught with so-
cial unrest. Increasing tension is manifested in the establishment of grass-
roots organisations like the Non-Citizen Congress in Latvia. 
 
The article was prepared in the framework of the grant of the Russian Founda-
tion for Humanities “The Formation of Parliamentary Elite in the Baltics after 
1990: Key actors and Factors”. 
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